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Years of Provocation, Followed
by a Loss of Control
Barry Mitchell
On 4 October 2010 the old common law plea of provocation which, if successful,
reduced murder to voluntary manslaughter, was abolished and replaced by the
partial defence of loss of control.1 This was the culmination of a crescendo of
criticism and frustration over three or four decades of case law, especially (but not
exclusively) about (1) the requirement of a loss of self-control, and the apparent bias
in favour of male reactions to provocation, and the law’s inadequate accommoda-
tion of female reactions; and (2) the nature of the normative element in the law and
the extent to which personal characteristics of the defendant could be taken into
account. In 2003 the Law Commission was asked to review the law, and following a
consultation process, proposals for reforming the plea were put forward in 2004.2
The government then invited the Commission to undertake a wider review of the
homicide law and their ﬁnal report, which reiterated their proposals, was published
towards the end of 2006.3 The new law, which is set out in the Coroners and
Justice Act 2009, adopts some of the Law Commission’s proposals but there are
some important differences between the structure and wording of those proposals
and the new plea.
This essay contains a brief review of some of the key elements and concerns
about the old common law before turning to explore its statutory replacement. In
so doing, it will argue that the decision to base the new law on a loss of control
requirement is fundamentally misguided. Whilst the use of ambiguous words and
phrases may allow the courts a necessary measure of discretion, it will simulta-
neously risk injustice to some deserving defendants. The essay will also suggest that
the objective requirement in the new plea has not been adequately thought
through.
1 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 56, abolishes the old provocation plea, and ss 54 and 55 replace
it with loss of control. In Northern Ireland the change in the law took effect from 1 June 2011.
2 See Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, 2004), especially Part 3.
3 See Law Commission,Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law ComNo 304, 2006), especially
paras 5.1–82.
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1. The Old Law of Provocation
The old common law on provocation had been recognized albeit in slightly
different forms since the 17th century.4 The law which prevailed until its abolition
was based on the deﬁnition offered by the then Devlin J in Duffy, that provocation
‘is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused, which would
cause in any reasonable man, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and
temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to
make him or her for the moment no longer master of his mind’.5 Various adjust-
ments were made to this over the years. For example, as Andrew Ashworth has
pointed out,6 although in practice the provocation commonly did originate from
the deceased, following section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 the law was not
restricted in this way,7 nor did the provocation have to be directed at the accused.8
Nevertheless, the principal features of the old common law were that the defendant
had to show that she had been provoked by some form of human action, that that
had caused her to lose her self-control (which she had not regained at the time of
inﬂicting the fatal assault), and that a reasonable person would have killed had she
been provoked in the same way. Some commentators doubted the law’s restriction
of provocation to human conduct:
Mere circumstances, however provocative, do not constitute a defence to murder. Loss of
control by a farmer on his crops being destroyed by a ﬂood, or his ﬂocks by foot-and-mouth,
a ﬁnancier ruined by a crash on the stock market or an author on his manuscript being
destroyed by lightning, could not, it seems, excuse a resulting killing. An ‘Act of God’ could
hardly be regarded as ‘something done’ within s.3. Since, where there is a provocative act, it
no longer need be done by the victim, this distinction begins to look a little thin. If D may
rely on the defence where the crops or the manuscript were destroyed by an unknown
arsonist or the stock exchange crash was engineered by other anonymous ﬁnanciers, why
should it be any different where no human agency was involved? The provocation is no
more and no less.9
Indeed, the common law’s insistence that the defendant’s reaction be triggered by
some form of human conduct was probably rooted in its origins when only a very
limited set of circumstances were regarded as sufﬁcient for a successful plea. It was
arguably also the result of a failure fully to get to grips with the underlying rationale
4 Excellent accounts of the emergence and historical development of the provocation plea can be
found in J Kaye, ‘The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter’ (1967) 83 LQR 365, 569;
AJ Ashworth, ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ (1976) 35 CLJ 292; andJ Horder, Provocation and
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
5 [1949] 1 All ER 932 (CCA).
6 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 251,
252.
7 See eg Davies [1975] QB 691 (CA).
8 See eg Pearson [1992] Crim LR 193 (CA).
9 See D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (12th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 491. See also BJ Mitchell, RDMackay, and WJ Brookbanks, ‘Pleading for Provoked Killers: In
Defence of Morgan Smith’ (2008) 124 LQR 675, 683.
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behind the plea and to pinpoint precisely what it is that warrants a reduction of
liability.
Nevertheless, the major criticisms of the law arose from the loss of self-control
and normative requirements.
Loss of self-control
Over the years the courts adopted various epithets in their attempts to explain what
they regarded as an appropriate response by the defendant, one of which was a loss
of self-control.10 Although the Court of Appeal in Richens11 stated that it was
wrong to say that the defendant must have completely lost his self-control such that
he did not know what he was doing—for that would be more indicative of
automatism which is a complete defence—there was never any clear deﬁnition of
this subjective requirement. There was a fundamental ambiguity in the law because
it was uncertain whether it required an incapacity to control one’s reaction to the
provocation, or whether a mere failure to do so would sufﬁce.12 Given the volume
of criticism heaped upon the loss of self-control requirement, it is somewhat ironic
that, as both Ashworth and the author discovered, the courts did not necessarily go
to any great lengths to see that this theoretical condition was actually fulﬁlled in the
individual case.13 Nevertheless, regardless of what sometimes happened in practice,
whilst this stretching of the law as set out in Duffy may have enabled the courts to
return what were perceived to be more just verdicts (eg, in cases of battered women
who killed their abusive partners), Ashworth observed that it also ‘weakened the
excusatory force that derives from acting in uncontrolled anger’.14 Clearly, any
excusatory force would have to be founded on some other form of mental or
emotional disturbance.
The ‘suddenness’ requirement
As Ashworth commented, the further requirement that the loss of self-control be
‘sudden’ was only introduced by Devlin J in Duffy and was unsupported by any
precedent.15 The intention behind the suddenness requirement was to distinguish
genuine deserving cases from revenge killings.16 Ashworth rightly criticized the
10 See the references in n 4 above.
11 [1993] 4 All ER 877 (CA).
12 Interestingly, the Law Commission referred to a comment made to them by psychiatrists that
those who do lose their self-control when provoked can usually afford to do so. ‘An angry strong man
can afford to lose his self-control with someone who provokes him, if that person is physically smaller
and weaker.’ See Law Commission, No 290, n 2 above, para 3.28.
13 Ashworth, n 4 above, 316; B Mitchell and S Cunningham, ‘Defences to Murder’ in Law
Commission, No 304, n 3 above, Appendix C.
14 Ashworth, n 6 above, 254.
15 Ibid, 252, 253.
16 Though it was subsequently argued that this is a false distinction because the usual motive for
killing whilst out of control is revenge; see R Holton and S Shute, ‘Self-Control in the Modern
Provocation Defence’ (2007) 27 OJLS 49.
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suddenness restriction for its bias—‘it favours those with quick tempers over others
with a slow-burning temperament (but no less intensity of emotion), and it favours
those with the physical strength to act quickly’.17 This latter form of bias was linked
to the perception that the law favoured men over women, although empirical
research conducted for the Law Commission did not support such favouritism.18
Initially at least, the suddenness requirement effectively restricted the scope of
the plea to cases where there was little time lapse between the provocation
and the defendant’s reaction to it; the fact that the defendant had lost self-control
at the time of inﬂicting the fatal assault was not sufﬁcient per se. Regrettably
though, the courts appeared to be inconsistent in this respect. As Ashworth pointed
out, in cases such as Fantle19 and Simpson20 the courts admitted evidence of the
background leading up to the fatal assault, whereas in Brown21 Bridge J thought
that the earlier events were irrelevant.22 Ashworth’s view was that Bridge J was
wrong: ‘[o]ne straw may indeed break a camel’s back’,23 and ‘the signiﬁcance of the
deceased’s ﬁnal act and its effect upon the accused—and indeed the relation of the
retaliation to that act—can be neither understood nor evaluated without reference
to previous dealings between the parties’.24 His criticism of Bridge J was subse-
quently underlined when in cases of ‘cumulative provocation’ the courts felt that
the time lapse between the provocation and retaliation was merely relevant but not
a conclusive factor.25 Indeed, as Ashworth again pointed out, there were occasions
on which the ‘sudden and temporary’ requirement seemed to have been completely
overlooked, as in Pearson where the defendant struck his abusive father twice with a
sledgehammer even though there had apparently been no ﬁnal act of provocation to
which the defendant’s action was a sudden response.26
Although the common law provocation plea has been abolished, its replacement
is loss of (self-) control, and so the concept is still enormously relevant under the
new law.
The normative element
Whilst the loss of self-control requirement in the old common law often proved a
stumbling block for battered women and various other deserving defendants,27 it
17 Ashworth, n 6 above, 253.
18 See RDMackay, ‘The Provocation Plea in Operation: An Empirical Study’, in Law Commission,
No 290, n 2 above, Appendix A.
19 [1959] Crim LR 585.
20 [1957] Crim LR 815.
21 [1972] 2 All ER 1328, 1332 (CA).
22 AJ Ashworth, ‘Sentencing in Provocation Cases’ [1975] Crim LR 553, 557.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 559.
25 See especially Lord Taylor CJ in Ahluwalia (1993) 69 Cr App R 133, 139 (CA).
26 The author’s own research also indicates there are unreported cases which are similar to Pearson
in this respect; see B Mitchell, ‘Distinguishing between Murder and Manslaughter in Practice’ (2007)
71 JCL 318.
27 Some of these were able to avoid a murder conviction and mandatory life sentence by pleading
diminished responsibility, though that was not necessarily an entirely satisfactory course to adopt.
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was the objective requirement which arguably attracted most criticism. Its basic aim
was to ensure that the plea would only be available to those who showed a
reasonable level of self-control and it thus sought to provide some justiﬁcation
for the loss or angry reaction. The normative requirement was initially articulated in
purely objective terms but this was revised by the House of Lords in Camplin.28 In
a much quoted speech Lord Diplock stated that when applying the objective test
the jury might take some of the defendant’s personal characteristics into account.
The trial judge ‘should . . . . explain to [the jury] that the reasonable man referred to
in the question is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an
ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing such
of the accused’s characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the
provocation to him’.29 In other words, the defendant’s sex and age might be
taken into account even though they are only relevant to the defendant’s capacity
to exercise self-control, along with other characteristics which were the object of or
relevant to the provocation.
In 1976, shortly before the House of Lords’ decision in Camplin, an article by
Ashworth was published in the Cambridge Law Journal30 in which he essentially
put forward the argument which was used by Lord Diplock. In this seminal article,
Ashworth argued that, with the possible exception of serious assaults, the gravity of
any provocation can only sensibly be judged in relation to people of a particular
class. ‘[T]he sight of two persons indulging in sexual intercourse cannot properly be
described as a grave provocation—for it would hardly provoke the unrelated
intruder to anything more than embarrassment—without adding that it would
be grave for someone who is married, engaged or related to one of the partici-
pants.’31 In advocating a narrower range of personal characteristics to be taken into
account than that which had been proposed by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee,32 he submitted that (with the exception of age and gender) those
which bore only on the defendant’s powers of self-control should be ignored
(unless, of course, they were the object of the provocation). Such a distinction
necessarily followed from the purpose of the objective requirement, namely to
stipulate and apply a general standard of self-control.
To lay down a test of ‘a man with reasonable self-control and with an unusually excitable
temperament’ would indeed be illogical; but a test of ‘an impotent man with reasonable self-
Although some women clearly have developed mental abnormalities through the abuse, others have
not. Critics of the law argued that not only is a conviction for diminished manslaughter stigmatizing in
itself, but the circumstances leading up to the killing should themselves be sufﬁcient to reduce liability
without the need to plead a medical or psychiatric excuse.
28 [1978] AC 705 (HL).
29 Ibid, 718.
30 See Ashworth, n 4 above.
31 Ibid, 300.
32 See Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences against the Person (London:
HMSO, 1976), para 54, where it was proposed that ‘any physical characteristics of the accused’ could
be taken into account when applying the objective test, but the Committee went on to say that ‘any
disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered’ should also be included.
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control’ contains no logical contradiction, for these two characteristics can co-exist and the
reference to impotence assists in interpreting the gravity of the provocation.33
It is fair to say that the use of the reasonable man/person as the benchmark against
which the defendant’s reaction should be compared probably caused much confu-
sion and misunderstanding. It was surely not intended to be used in the same way
as it is in other areas of the law such as the tort of negligence. In the civil law the
reasonable person test is used as setting a minimum standard of acceptable conduct,
and the defendant either meets that standard (and incurs no legal liability) or does
not. In Morhall Lord Goff explained that in provocation the test’s function was to
induce the court to compare the defendant’s reaction with that of an ordinary
person with a normal capacity for self-control.34 In effect, it was a means whereby
the courts could distinguish the deserving from the undeserving cases. As a
consequence of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, once there was evidence
that the defendant had been provoked to lose self-control the matter then had to be
passed to the jury who would decide whether a reasonable person would have
reacted as the defendant had.
Ashworth also used causal reasoning as a means of understanding the rationale
behind provocation, and he linked it to the issue of relevant characteristics. Where
there is some signiﬁcant or grave provocation, the defendant’s loss of self-control
could be attributed to it, whereas in cases of trivial provocation the loss of self-
control is due more to a weakness in the defendant’s make-up than the provoca-
tion.35 It is, of course, in cases of trivial provocation that the defence are more
likely to want personal characteristics to be taken into account; these are cases
where the characteristic, such as some form of mental abnormality or personality
deﬁciency (which are discussed below), provides an explanation or excuse for the
loss of self-control.
The case law which emerged after Camplin was confusing and inconsistent. It
was not simply that the courts sometimes ignored the distinction which Ashworth
and Lord Diplock had advocated, nor that the hypothetical reasonable man became
increasingly (and impractically) anthropomorphized; ultimately the confusion and
disagreement reached its height on whether undesirable or discreditable character-
istics, or mental abnormalities could be taken into account. In Morhall the House
of Lords held that in the light of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 juries should
be directed to take account of anything they thought was relevant to the assessment
of the strength of the provocation. This seemed to include discreditable character-
istics such as irascibility or racial prejudice. From a purely pragmatic perspective it
might be suggested that it was enough to leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide
whether a characteristic was so discreditable that it should not be used to enable the
defendant to reduce his liability. But in principle there was arguably no good
explanation for such an approach. Morhall was an addicted glue-sniffer who was
33 Ashworth, n 4 above, 301. The reference to the defendant’s impotence is clearly a reference to the
case of Bedder v DPP (1954) 38 Cr App R 133 (HL) which was overruled on this point by Camplin.
34 Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 659, 665 (HL).
35 Ashworth, n 4 above, 308.
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taunted about his addiction. How, one might wonder, would a jury take this into
account when applying the objective test?36
More fundamentally, Ashworth argued that this is unsatisfactory on the ground
that the objective test should exclude attitudes and reactions which are inconsistent
with the aims and values which the law seeks to uphold.37 He also demonstrated his
desire to be guided by principle when considering the merits of other characteristics
such as culture. If the law was trying to ensure that deserving defendants have
shown a reasonable level of self-control, then youth should be regarded as relevant
because ‘there is good reason to maintain that a lower standard may be accepted’.
Conversely, cultural background may well be relevant to assessing the seriousness of
the provocation but there is no clear reason why it should justify the reduction of
the expected standard of self-control unless greater weight is attached to the desire
for ‘cultural pluralism’.38 Two simple observations can be made here. First, the law
should not expect a person to exercise a level of self-control that he was incapable of
exercising, and secondly, a decision had to be made—and still has to be made under
the new law—about whether provocation was the appropriate plea where there was
an incapacity or reduced capacity.
The other major controversial issue relating to characteristics that are relevant to
the objective test concerned mental disorders and personality disorders, and here
the conﬂict in the case law was ultimately between the Privy Council and the House
of Lords. In Luc Thiet Thuan39 the majority of the Privy Council declined to take
account of the defendant’s brain damage when applying the reasonable man
standard. Lord Goff took the same view as that taken by Ashworth,40 that the
provocation plea was designed for ordinary ‘normal’ people, not for those suffering
from some form of mental abnormality. This, of course, follows the distinction
advocated by Lord Diplock and Ashworth in that only characteristics relevant to
the provocation should be taken into account. However, in Smith (Morgan)41 the
majority of the House of Lords decided that in the light of section 3 of the
Homicide Act 1957 juries should be able to determine which characteristics to
take into account, including mental abnormalities. Two of their lordships (Lords
Hobhouse and Millett) took the same view as Ashworth that those who seek to rely
on mental abnormality to reduce their liability should base their defence on
diminished responsibility. But the majority thought that the distinction between
characteristics relevant to the provocation and those relevant to the power of self-
control is unrealistic. Moreover, although certain characteristics such as pugnacity,
undue excitability, short temper, or morbid jealousy should always be excluded,
36 Similarly, one might wonder how the jury would take account of the defendant’s immaturity and
attention-seeking in Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008 (CA), and ‘obsessive and eccentric’ personality
in Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987 (CA).
37 Ashworth, n 6 above, 256.
38 Ibid. In Ali [1989] Crim LR 736 the Court of Appeal explained that age is not always relevant.
There the fact that the defendant was 20 years old at the time was immaterial; it mattered not whether
he was 20 or, say, 35; one would expect the same general level of self-control in either case.
39 [1997] AC 131 (PC).
40 Ashworth, n 4 above, 312.
41 [2001] 1 AC 146 (HL).
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they felt that the primary concern was to do justice in the circumstances of the
case even if that might cause some uncertainty or lack of clarity as to the law.
One particular dimension of this was that the law should not expect people to
exercise self-control when, though no fault of their own, they were incapable of
doing so.42
But the Privy Council had the last word on the issue. In A-G for Jersey v Holley43
a majority (six to three) of the court effectively overruled Smith (Morgan) and held
that unless they are relevant to the provocation, mental abnormalities should
be excluded when applying the reasonable person standard. Thus the principle
expressed by Ashworth and adopted by Lord Diplock in Camplin prevailed; the law
of provocation required a reasonable level of self-control from provoked defendants
regardless of any mental abnormalities. The Court of Appeal subsequently accepted
this interpretation of the law.44 Those who had been provoked but sought to rely
on a mental abnormality as the explanation for loss of self-control should plead
diminished responsibility instead.
A further dimension to the objective requirement—proportionality
There was another, perhaps less obvious, objective dimension to the old common
law which concerned the relationship between the provocation and the defendant’s
reaction to it. This was once known as the ‘reasonable relationship rule’,45 but it
ceased to be a rule of substantive law and became instead one of evidential
signiﬁcance.46 Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 required the court to be
satisﬁed that the provocation ‘was enough to make the reasonable man do as he
did ’ (emphasis added).47 The obvious ambiguity here was whether those last four
words mean that the reasonable man would have killed in precisely the same way as
the defendant did or whether it merely means that the reasonable man would have
lost control and killed in some way. In Phillips48 Lord Diplock said that common
sense dictated that loss of self-control is a matter of degree and that the nature of
a person’s reaction to provocation will depend on its gravity. In other words,
the nature and gravity of the provocation should be reﬂected in the nature of the
defendant’s reaction to it. The implication behind this was that the reasonable
person would carry on behaving reasonably even after losing his self-control.
42 For contrasting views about Smith (Morgan) see eg J Gardner and T Macklem, ‘Compassion
without Respect? Nine Fallacies in R v Smith’ [2001] Crim LR 623; T Macklem and J Gardner,
‘Provocation and Pluralism’ (2001) 64 MLR 815; RD Mackay and BJ Mitchell, ‘Provoking Dimin-
ished Responsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One?’ [2003] Crim LR 745; J Chalmers, ‘Merging
Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism’ [2004] Crim LR 198;
J Gardner and T Macklem, ‘No Provocation without Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay and Mitchell’
[2004] Crim LR 213; RD Mackay and BJ Mitchell, ‘Replacing Provocation: More on a Combined
Plea’ [2004] Crim LR 219.
43 [2005] UKPC 23.
44 See Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 1880; James [2006] EWCA Crim 14, [2006] QB 588.
45 Following the decision in Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 (HL).
46 After the decision in Brown [1972] 2 QB 229 (CA).
47 In Camplin Lord Diplock included a similar condition in his model direction.
48 [1969] 2 AC 130, 137 (PC).
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Ashworth has persuasively argued, however, that the ‘reaction’ in this context has
not always been properly understood. It should refer to the degree of loss of self-
control, rather than the extent of the violence in D’s reaction, as being in propor-
tion to the gravity of the provocation.49 Thus, since the defendant must necessarily
have been provoked so as to lose his self-control it makes no sense to stipulate that
the reasonable person would have done exactly what the defendant did.50 Our
desire for proportionality is surely satisﬁed if the provocation was sufﬁciently grave
to justify the angry loss of self-control which resulted in the use of fatal force.
2. The Review of the Old Law
At the end of its review the Law Commission identiﬁed three principal problems
with the old law—(1) there was a lack of judicial control over pleas so that even
where there was only very trivial provocation the judge had to allow the matter to
be determined by the jury; (2) the sudden and temporary loss of self-control
requirement was problematic—there was a tension between it and slow-burn
cases, and there was also some difﬁculty applying the law (which was clearly
based on anger) to situations where the predominant emotion was fear; and (3)
the inconsistencies in the case law regarding the defendant’s characteristics which
may be relevant to the reasonable person standard.51
The Commission recommended a reformed partial defence of provocation52
based on two limbs, namely (i) a fear of serious violence, and (ii) gross provocation
in the sense of words and/or conduct which caused the defendant to have a
justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged.53 The ﬁrst of these was meant to ﬁll
a gap in the law where defendants fear serious violence and overreact by killing the
aggressor in order to thwart an attack. The government doubted whether many
such cases actually arose but accepted the Commission’s wider point that shoe-
horning these cases into a plea based on anger is difﬁcult.54 As to the second limb of
the Commission’s proposal, the government felt that as a general rule people should
be able to control their reactions when they think they have been wronged but
accepted that there is a small number of situations in which the provocation is so
strong that some allowance should be given to them.55 The government therefore
49 Ashworth, n 4 above, 305.
50 Ashworth, n 6 above, 259.
51 Law Com No 304, n 3 above, paras 5.15–46.
52 The Law Commission recommended a restructuring of the substantive law, so that (if successful)
provocation would effectively reduce murder in the ﬁrst degree to murder in the second degree; n 3
above, para 9.6. The previous New Labour government was not persuaded to implement the proposed
restructuring, and the Coalition government concluded ‘that the time is not right to take forward such
a substantial reform of our criminal law’; see Ministry of Justice, Report on the Implementation of Law
Commission Proposals (London: TSO, 2011), para 54.
53 Law Com No 304, n 3 above, para 9.17.
54 Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law:
Consultation Paper CP19/08 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008), paras 26 and 27.
55 Ibid, paras 31–4. The government cited an example from the Law Commission’s report of a rape
victim who kills his attacker after being taunted about what happened.
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decided to abolish the old common plea56 and replace it with words and/or conduct
which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character and which caused
the defendant to have a justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged.
Whereas the Law Commission considered that the loss of self-control concept
had been so troublesome that it should be abandoned, and that undeserving cases
would nonetheless be excluded by the safeguards they incorporated elsewhere in
their recommendations, the then government took a more pessimistic and cautious
approach. The Ministry of Justice remained ‘concerned that there is a risk of
the partial defence being used inappropriately, for example, in cold-blooded,
gang-related or “honour” killings. Even in cases which are less obviously less
unsympathetic, there is still a fundamental problem about providing a partial
defence in situations where a defendant has killed while basically in full possession
of his or her senses, even if he or she is frightened, other than in a situation which is
complete self-defence.’57 At the same time, the government decided to remove the
‘suddenness’ requirement ‘to make plain that situations where the defendant’s
reaction has been delayed or builds gradually are not excluded’.58
As to the third of the principal problems with the old law, both the Law
Commission and the government favoured the majority view in Holley and that
of Ashworth and Lord Diplock, that there should be a general standard of self-
control.59 Concessions to the defendant’s capacity to exercise self-control should be
made only by taking account of her age and gender. The difﬁculty here is that there
are no clear objective or scientiﬁc data about consistency in levels of self-control.
We do not know how much consistency there is in people’s views about when self-
control should or should not be exercised, nor do we know the degree of similarity
in people’s ability to exercise self-control in any given set of circumstances. The Law
Commission and the government also rightly felt that judges ought not to have to
direct juries on provocation (now loss of control) where the evidence is very poor.60
Otherwise, there is a greater risk of inconsistencies and verdicts which ﬂy in the face
of the law.
3. The New Law of Loss of Control
By virtue of ss 54 and 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 the court must now
be satisﬁed that the defendant’s participation in the killing resulted from a loss of
self-control which was triggered in one of two ways. Either it must have been
56 The government took the view that the term ‘provocation’ had acquired such ‘negative con-
notations’ that it should be abandoned (ibid, para 34), though Andrew Ashworth suggests that the
term will continue to be used in practice; see n 6 above, 261.
57 Ibid, para 36. The Ministry conﬁrmed this view after the consultation process was completed
(para 62).
58 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law: Summary of Responses
and Government Position: Response to Consultation CP(R)19/08 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008),
para 66.
59 Ibid, para 78.
60 Ibid, para 80.
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triggered by the defendant’s fear of serious violence from the victim against the
defendant or someone else, or it must have been prompted by something done and/
or said which was of an extremely grave character and caused the defendant to have
a justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged. Whichever trigger is appropriate, the
court must also be satisﬁed that (a) the trigger was something other than sexual
inﬁdelity;61 (b) the trigger was not self-induced; (c) the defendant must not have
acted ‘in a considered desire for revenge’; and (d) ‘a person of D’s sex and age, with
a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might
have reacted in the same or a similar way to D’.62 Thus, the reasonable person test
at common law has been replaced by a person of normal tolerance and self-restraint
etc, and instead of referring to the defendant’s characteristics when applying the
objective test we should henceforth refer to the defendant’s circumstances.
At the time of writing this essay there has been just one reported case, Clinton,63
in which the new partial defence has been raised, and it is obviously impossible to
know at this stage how far that case reﬂects the way in which the courts will
interpret the new law. That said, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, warned that
some aspects of the new legislation ‘are likely to produce surprising results’.64
The triggers
The ﬁrst of the two possible triggers of the defendant’s fatal assault is a fear of
serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identiﬁed person.
In broad terms this is surely a welcome development. The precise boundary
between serious and non-serious violence may sometimes not be immediately
apparent, but the government required that the fear must be of ‘serious’ violence
in order to exclude unmeritorious cases.65 The law does not expressly stipulate that
the fear must be of imminent violence, but the government is relying on the loss of
self-control condition, the need to fulﬁl the person of normal tolerance test, and
evidence (for example) whether the defendant had sought other protection as being
sufﬁcient safeguards to ensure that only deserving cases beneﬁt from the new plea.66
The alternative form of the plea arises where the loss of self-control was triggered
by words and/or conduct which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave
character and caused the defendant to have a justiﬁable sense of being seriously
wronged. One of the central aims of the new law is to reduce the number of cases in
which defendants reduce their liability from murder to manslaughter and to limit
the application of the new pleas to ‘exceptional circumstances’67—hence the
‘extremely grave character’ requirement. There is also a desire to stipulate general
standards of reaction to provocation, and the ‘justiﬁable sense of being seriously
61 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 55(6)(c).
62 Ibid, s 54(1)(c).
63 [2012] EWCA Crim 2.
64 Ibid, at [2].
65 Response to Consultation CP(R)19/08, n 58 above, para 28.
66 Ibid, paras 29 and 30.
67 Ibid, para 36.
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wronged’ requirement is one element of this. An obvious concern here is the
ambiguity and uncertainty of the language—‘extremely grave’ and ‘seriously
wronged’. Some of the wording in section 55(4) is based on the Law Commission’s
recommendation, and the Commission thought that the word ‘justiﬁable’ should
be construed objectively.68 The government took the same view, believing it is
unnecessary to ‘spell that out’,69 but the statute does not make this clear and as
Simester et al commented, there must surely be a risk that it will be confused with
‘excusable’ or ‘understandable’.70
Sexual inﬁdelity by the victim was regarded by the previous New Labour
government as an inadequate ground, and if it is one aspect of a wider set of
circumstances then it should be disregarded when deciding whether those circum-
stances should sufﬁce to reduce murder to manslaughter. But it is not easy to
appreciate why the previous administration felt it was necessary expressly to exclude
sexual inﬁdelity from the words or conduct trigger, and indeed there may well be
good reason to suspect that a potential conﬂict has been created within the new law.
On the face of it, it seems that the New Labour government was heavily inﬂuenced
by the support it received for the exclusion from various organizations. In contrast
it also felt that perpetrators of ‘honour killings’ should not beneﬁt from the new
plea, but instead of expressly excluding this category as well it was content that ‘the
high threshold for the words and conduct limb of the partial defence will have the
effect of excluding “honour killings” because such cases will not satisfy the require-
ments that the circumstances were of an extremely grave character and caused a
justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged’71—together with the exemption of
cases where the killing resulted from a considered desire for revenge. Why should
not the same be true of sexual inﬁdelity?72 Moreover, as Simester et al argue, if
having been properly directed by the judge a jury concludes that a person with
normal tolerance and self-restraint would also have reacted with fatal violence, it is
difﬁcult to see why the plea should be denied.73
The prohibition of sexual inﬁdelity as a qualifying trigger is especially problem-
atical.74 What, for example, does ‘sexual inﬁdelity’ mean? It is not deﬁned in the
2009 Act. Should it be conﬁned to the words and acts of sexual intercourse, so that
the effects of it are not excluded? Must there be some form of relationship between
the parties and, if so, what?
68 Law Com No 290, n 2 above, para 3.70.
69 Response to Consultation CP(R)19/08, n 58 above, para 45.
70 See AP Simester, JR Spencer, GR Sullivan, and GJ Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law:
Theory and Doctrine (4th edn, Oxford: Hart, 2010), 399 and 400.
71 Response to Consultation CP(R)19/08, n 58 above, para 56.
72 The government went out of its way to exclude any trace of sexual inﬁdelity from the new law.
‘We believe that where sexual inﬁdelity is one part in a set of circumstances which led to the defendant
losing self-control, the partial defence should succeed or fail on the basis of those circumstances
disregarding the element of sexual inﬁdelity’ (emphasis added); ibid, para 55.
73 Simester et al, n 68 above, 399.
74 For a fuller discussion of these problems, see Professor David Ormerod’s comments in Smith and
Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 520–22.
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By a combination of analysis of the structure and wording of sections 54 and 55
of the 2009 Act together with careful scrutiny of comments by government
ministers about the purpose and intended effect of the new law, the Court of
Appeal in Clinton75 concluded that (i)_sexual inﬁdelity could not by itself constitute
a qualifying trigger, but (ii) evidence of sexual inﬁdelity may be admissible because
of its relevance to the circumstances in which the defendant reacted to a (legally
acceptable) qualifying trigger.76 The Court stressed the need to consider the
context in which the loss of control occurred. Lord Judge CJ illustrated this by
reference to a situation in which the defendant returned home unexpectedly to ﬁnd
her spouse having consensual sexual intercourse with her sister. When the defen-
dant complained about what she discovered, her unfaithful spouse justiﬁed what he
had done, shouting and taunting the defendant in hurtful language that it is she
(the defendant) who was really responsible for the inﬁdelity. The taunts and
distressing words, that do not constitute sexual inﬁdelity, may be treated as a
qualifying trigger (under section 55(4)). ‘The idea that, in the search for a qualify-
ing trigger, the context in which such words are used should be ignored represents
an artiﬁciality which the administration of criminal justice should do without.’77
The loss of self-control requirement
At the heart of the new law there remains the need for a loss of self-control, and it is
difﬁcult to avoid the conclusion that this will necessarily prevent much of the
reform and improvement in the law which had been sought. The Law Commission
was worried that a loss of self-control requirement would inevitably favour men
over women and thought that there was no overriding need to replace it with some
other form of subjective requirement;78 rather it would be sufﬁcient to stipulate
that the provocation had not been triggered by a considered desire for revenge, that
the defendant should not have ‘engineered’ or incited it, and that either judges
could exclude undeserving cases or that juries could be trusted to do so.79 Ash-
worth, though, criticized the Commission’s approach on theoretical rather than
practical grounds—it ‘seeks to detach the provocation defence from one of its true
rationales, which is that a good reason for partially excusing such defendants is that
they acted during a distinct emotional disturbance resulting from what was done to
75 [2012] EWCA Crim 2.
76 Ibid, at [34]–[44].
77 Ibid, at [23].
78 The Law Commission did consider the alternative concept in the American Model Penal Code,
‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’, but consultation with academics and judges yielded much
criticism of vagueness and indiscrimination; and the Commission also feared it would produce
considerable case law; see Law Com No 304, n 3 above, para 5.22. The Commission did, though,
acknowledge that EMED ‘has formed the basis for a provocation defence in at least some American
jurisdictions, and cannot therefore be dismissed as unworkable’. Other commentators have argued that
EMED is a more accurate and more defensible concept than loss of self-control; see eg Mitchell et al,
n 9 above.
79 Law Com No 304, n 3 above, paras 5.17–27.
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them’.80 Ashworth’s concern is not with the proposal to abolish the loss of self-
control requirement but with the suggestion that there should be nothing put in its
place. Interestingly, Horder had earlier ﬂoated the idea of what he called ‘provoked
extreme emotional disturbance’ as a substitute subjective requirement.81 Indeed,
various alternatives to the loss of self-control requirement have been offered, some
of which also seek to put emotional disturbance at the core of the subjective test.
Such suggestions have been criticized essentially for their uncertainty. Regrettably
though, the government’s preferred condition, that there must be a loss of self-
control, remains undeﬁned and vague, and there is no apparent reason to assume
that the case law on it will be any more consistent than it was under the old
common law.
Prima facie, the only apparent difference between the old and the new law is that
the loss of self-control need no longer be ‘sudden and temporary’. Quite how a loss
of self-control could be anything other than temporary is hard to envisage, and the
more signiﬁcant questions surround the suddenness requirement. Its removal
under the new law appears to indicate a wish to formally accommodate slow-
burn cases. Yet one obvious category of such cases—battered women who kill their
abusers—would still have to surmount the loss of self-control hurdle, and previous
experience clearly indicates that many of these women would not be able to rely on
the new plea.82 Welcoming the Law Commission’s proposal to include the fear of
serious violence trigger, the government stated that it should be available even
though the violence is not imminent.83 It is, however, not easy to imagine a
situation in which the defendant was fearful of non-imminent serious violence
and still lost his or (perhaps more likely) her self-control. Although concern about
this was expressed by consultees, the government asserted that a loss of self-control
is not always ‘inconsistent with situations where a person reacts to an imminent fear
of serious violence’.84 Unfortunately, there was no comment on cases where the
fear is not imminent.
The paradigmatic provocation case under the old common law was based on the
idea that the defendant ‘exploded’ with anger (and lashed out with fatal violence),
and the anger then subsided. But whether the new law will be noticeably different
in this respect from the common law is open to doubt. It has already been suggested
that this distinction between the old and the new law ought not in fact make much
difference. A loss of self-control can only occur ‘as a moment of departure from
80 Ashworth, n 6 above, 254.
81 See J Horder, ‘Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence’ (2005) 25 OJLS
123, 134–9. ‘Where, on a charge of murder, the judge considers there to be evidence that D was
provoked to play his or her part in the killing in a state of extreme emotional disturbance, he or she
should direct the jury that the offence may for that reason be found to be manslaughter. Further,
‘ “extreme emotional disturbance” is conﬁned to circumstances in which it is produced by a combina-
tion of gravely provoked anger and D’s fear for his or her own safety (or the safety of another), being no
mere pretext for the taking of premeditated revenge.’
82 See eg Ahluwalia (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 (CA); and Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 Cr App R 108
(CA).
83 Consultation Paper CP19/08, n 54 above, paras 26 and 29.
84 Ibid, para 63, emphasis added.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 3/5/2012, SPi
126 Criminal Law
Comp. by: Pg2689 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001546919 Date:3/5/12 Time:08:07:32
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001546919.3D127
being in control’.85 Moreover, the decision to admit evidence of cumulative
provocation over a lengthy period, so as to provide the context in which the ﬁnal
incident (which may have been relatively trivial) occurred, effectively undermined
the element of suddenness. Conversely, as has already been indicated, the new plea
will automatically fail if the defendant acted in a considered desire for revenge, and
the longer the time gap between the trigger and the fatal assault, the greater is the
risk that the court will infer that the killing was vengeful.86
Thus, it has elsewhere been suggested that rather than focus on the physical
nature of the defendant’s reaction the law should concentrate on the impact of the
trigger (provocation) on his mind87—after all, the defendant receives and processes
the trigger in his mind; the physical response follows from that and is merely
(ambiguous) evidence of the impact of the trigger. Arguably therefore, the law
should instead put some form of mental or emotional disturbance at the heart of
the plea.88 One consequence of that would be the avoidance of the problem in both
the old and the new law of satisfactorily reconciling the loss of self-control
requirement with acceptance of a time lapse before the fatal assault.
The objective requirements
As well as losing self-control through one of the two triggers the defendant will only
succeed under the new law if a ‘person of D’s age and sex, with a normal degree of
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the
same or in a similar way to D’. As under the old law the assumption behind this is
that there is a generally recognized and recognizable standard of tolerance and self-
restraint that most people could and would exercise when provoked or fearful. But
no evidence to support this has ever been produced, so the government’s aim of
setting a general normative standard is based more on hope and assumption than on
reliable data. Moreover, even if the assumption is well-founded, it is almost
inevitable that juries will vary in their precise location of the maximum level of
self-restraint, and there is thus a real risk that the cases will result in inconsistent
decisions in the interpretation of this requirement.
The phrase ‘circumstances of D’ speciﬁcally excludes ‘those whose only relevance
to D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance and self-
restraint’.89 In essence, this reproduces the law after the decision in Holley so that,
apart from age and gender, individual characteristics of the defendant will only be
attributable to the ‘person with normal tolerance and self-restraint’ if they are
relevant to the triggering event. As under the old common law, trial judges will
85 A Norrie, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Partial Defences to Murder (1) Loss of Control’
[2010] Crim LR 275, 288.
86 Simester et al, n 70 above, 397.
87 See Mitchell et al, n 9 above.
88 As indicated above, Ashworth criticized the Law Commission for not recommending something
such as an ‘element of emotional disturbance’ to put in place of the loss of control requirement; n 6
above, 260.
89 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54 (3).
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have to direct juries very carefully about this distinction and which characteristics
they can and cannot take into account, in what circumstances and for what
purpose. One of the main criticisms of the old law before Holley was that those
courts which took the same approach as in Smith effectively subjectivized (and, in
so doing, diluted) the normative elements in a way which was morally repugnant
(eg, by taking account of the defendant’s discreditable characteristics) and this
predictably led to calls for ‘purer’ objective requirements. At the same time though,
Ashworth pointed out that if the principle of autonomy is to be maintained an
objective test should be subject to capacity-based exceptions.90 The principle of
autonomy, that each person should be treated as responsible for his own conduct,
implies that each individual has sufﬁcient free will to choose how to behave in any
situation and thus should be regarded as an independent agent. If the conduct
breaches the law the individual can rightly be held liable and punished. The danger
in adopting objective requirements is that any individual may, through no fault of
his own, be incapable of acting in a way which would have avoided contravening
the law. This, of course, echoes the concern of Lords Hoffmann and Clyde in Smith
that the law would be unjustiﬁed in expecting a person to conform to a standard of
which he is, through no fault on his part, incapable of achieving.
Given the New Labour government’s desire to ‘toughen up’ this part of the law it
is not surprising to ﬁnd that the new plea is littered with objective requirements—
apart from the obvious ‘person with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint . . . ’ test, those who rely on the fear trigger must fear serious violence,
which will surely be construed according to what the court treats as serious; those
who rely on the words and/or conduct trigger will only succeed if the court thinks
they are of an extremely grave character and that they caused the defendant to have a
justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged. In some cases the facts are likely to be
such that it is clear whether these tests are or are not fulﬁlled, but there will be
many where there is no such certainty.91 Thus, any beneﬁts which may be derived
by adopting a stricter normative requirement are, at least in the early years before
any line of authority or clarity is established, likely to be at the cost of maximum
certainty.
Judicial directions to the jury
At this relatively early stage in the life of the new law it is obviously difﬁcult to
predict with conﬁdence how it will work in practice, but it is impossible not to be
concerned that juries will ﬁnd it perplexing. In addition to the ambiguities in some
of the words and phrases in ss 54 and 55 of the 2009 Act, the structure and wording
of it is complicated, and judges are likely to be hard-pressed to explain it in clear and
simple terms. The jury needs to be told that the burden is on the prosecution to
90 Ashworth, n 6 above, 189.
91 Moreover, there is the danger that a purely objective interpretation of these words will lead to
injustice by denying the plea to deserving defendants such as battered women or very young
defendants.
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satisfy them that the plea fails.92 They should be advised to consider evidence of
one of the two recognized triggers. For the fear trigger, was it of serious violence; did
the defendant fear the violence would emanate from the victim; was the feared
violence directed at the defendant or another? For the words or conduct trigger, did
this constitute something of an extremely grave character; and did it cause the
defendant to justiﬁably feel she had been seriously wronged? In relation to either
trigger, was it self-induced? If the killing was prompted solely through sexual
inﬁdelity or in considered desire for revenge, the plea must fail. Whichever trigger
is appropriate, the defendant must have lost her self-control and not regained it at
the time of the assault, and the jury must be made aware of what constitutes such a
loss. Then they have to consider the objective test, whether a person of the
defendant’s age and sex, ‘with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint, and
in the defendant’s circumstances, might have reacted in the same or in a similar
way’. The judge will have to identify which of the defendant’s circumstances might
be applicable. He will have to tell the jury to ignore any morally repugnant or
discreditable characteristics, and only take account of any mental abnormalities if
they were relevant to the trigger. The new law thus surely makes very heavy
demands both of judges and juries.
The relationship between loss of self-control and diminished
responsibility
Evidence of both loss of self-control and diminished responsibility might arise in
the course of any individual case, even though following the Privy Council’s
decision in Holley, and certainly under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the
two pleas should now be regarded as mutually exclusive: if pleaded in the same case
they ought to be considered in the alternative.93 Where a person was suffering from
an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ (as deﬁned in section 52 of the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009) which caused him to lose his self-control and strike out with
fatal violence, then he may plead diminished responsibility, regardless of any
provocation to which he may have been subjected. Evidence of such abnormality
may also be relevant where the defendant pleads loss of self-control (under the
words and/or conduct trigger) if it is the object of the provocation. To that extent
therefore, the defendant can raise both pleas, but this presents a potential problem.
Where diminished responsibility is relied on, the burden of proof lies with the
defendant and the burden must be discharged on a balance of probabilities;94
whereas it is for the prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt a loss of self-
control.95 Clearly, there is a real likelihood that these differences in the burdens and
standards of proof will cause considerable difﬁculties for juries.
92 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(5).
93 The author has begun to monitor the operation of the new law and has already encountered cases
in which both pleas are being raised, but the basis on which they are raised is unknown.
94 Homicide Act 1957, s 2(2), and Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1 (CCA).
95 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(5) and (6).
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Sentencing
It is worth making some brief comments about sentencing in provocation
manslaughter cases as well as on the substantive law. The guidelines drafted by
the then Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2005 indicate that, as Ashworth had
suggested many years earlier,96 the dominant consideration when determining
the appropriate sentence in provocation manslaughter should be the objective
seriousness of the provocation itself.97 Other factors include the extent and
timing of the retaliation, post-offence behaviour, and the use of a weapon. Judges
need to have clear lines of direction. For example, where there is a short time
between the provocation and the loss of self-control the defendant’s culpability is
likely to be less, but longer gaps between the two should not necessarily imply
greater culpability in cases of cumulative provocation. The use of a weapon prima
facie suggests greater culpability, but only if it was carried to the scene by the
defendant—if it was used simply because it was conveniently at hand, no real
increase in seriousness is implied. In addition, there may be an important
difference between a man and a woman—who may be signiﬁcantly weaker than
her victim—using a weapon.
The SGC guidelines state that where there is a high degree of provocation over a
short period, the starting point should be three years’ custody, up to a maximum of
four years. In cases of substantial provocation (over a short period) the starting
point should be eight years, within a range of four to nine years; and if the
provocation was at a low level over a short time, the starting point should be twelve
years, and the range ten years to life imprisonment. Bearing in mind that offenders
serving a year or more in prison can expect to be released at the half-way stage,98
Ashworth indicated that some of these sentences—where the provocation is high—
seem very low.99 Provocation (now loss of control) manslaughter is a form of
mitigated murder, and on average murderers can expect to spend at least 15 or 16
years in prison before being able to apply for release on licence.100 As Ashworth
explained, the justiﬁcation for the low sentences must be based on the offender’s
reduced culpability arising out of the loss of self-control and partial justiﬁcation for
that loss. But, not surprisingly perhaps, the political tide appears to have turned in
favour of tougher sentences where the harm is so serious, and as Ashworth rightly
suggests, the current guidelines may have to be revised. It has recently been
suggested that one consequence of the enactment of Sch 21 to the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 will be a general ratcheting up of sentences for all serious crimes,
including manslaughter by provocation/loss of control.101 Indeed, dealing with
96 AJ Ashworth, ‘Sentencing in Provocation Cases’ [1975] Crim LR 553, 560.
97 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation (London: SGC, 2005),
paras 3.2 and 4.2.
98 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 244.
99 A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 122.
100 Statistics kindly provided to the author by the National Offender Management Service. The
shortest minimum term which a convicted murderer is likely to serve is about 6 years.
101 D Jeremy, ‘Sentencing Policy or Short-term Expediency?’ [2010] Crim LR 593.
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an appeal against sentence in an unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter case the
Lord Chief Justice commented that following the 2003 Act ‘crimes which result in
death should be treated more seriously and dealt with more severely than before’.102
4. Provocation and Principles
It was not surprising to ﬁnd such a strong desire to be rid of the old provocation
plea, though one of the underlying problems was the struggle to identify a clear
rationale behind it. Some commentators have categorized it as essentially excusato-
ry, on the basis that the defendant was acting out of control (as a consequence of the
provocation) and was thus less culpable.103 Others, such as Ashworth, acknowl-
edged this but also recognized an element of justiﬁcation in the loss of self-
control.104 Yet a third school of opinion preferred to regard the rationale as one
of partial responsibility because of the disturbed mental or emotional state of mind
of the defendant.105 But much of the criticism of the provocation plea must surely
be attributed to a failure to consistently follow or apply legal principles and policies.
An obvious concern with both the old and almost certainly the new law is the
failure to comply with the principle of maximum certainty.106 There was uncer-
tainty about how far the courts would look closely at the evidence of a loss of self-
control, about which characteristics would be treated as relevant to the objective
test (especially whether they would adopt the Smith or Holley approach), and thus
about the relationship between provocation and diminished responsibility.
The latter two issues appear to have been settled under the new law, but it
remains to be seen how the courts construe the central concept of loss of self-
control. If they regard it in the same light as under the old law, then much of the
potential beneﬁt to battered women from the introduction of the fear of serious
violence trigger will effectively be frustrated (as under the old law). In addition,
much of the terminology of the new law—especially in the words and/or conduct
trigger (extremely grave character, justiﬁable sense of being seriously wronged)—is
ambiguous, so that certainty will depend on the emergence of a clear and consistent
body of case law. It is perhaps too early to be really critical, and as Ashworth
reminds us, the principle is of maximum not absolute certainty,107 so that some
uncertainty is inescapable in order to avoid undue rigidity.108
Concerns have also been raised about the extent to which the old law complied
with the principle of proportionality. One of the central criticisms of the old law
102 Appleby [2009] EWCA Crim 2693, [2010] 2 Cr App R (S) 46.
103 See eg J Dressler, ‘Provocation, Partial Justiﬁcation or Partial Excuse?’ (1998) 51 MLR 467.
104 Ashworth, n 6 above, 254.
105 Mitchell et al, n 9 above.
106 Referring to the obvious potential ambiguity of the wording in s 55(3) and (4), Lord Judge CJ
warned in Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2 at [11]: ‘[T]here is no point in pretending that the practical
application of this provision will not create considerable difﬁculties. . . . The statutory language is not
bland.’
107 Ashworth, n 6 above, 66.
108 Ashworth refers to this as part of a policy of social defence, n 6 above, 66, 67.
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was that it accommodated undeserving defendants, inter alia because the courts did
not always insist on a loss of self-control, and because they sometimes took account
of inappropriate characteristics of the defendant instead of adopting a tougher
normative approach. In other words, there was a lack of proportion between the
real mitigation and the verdict. The courts were encouraged to look at the
relationship between the gravity of the provocation and the defendant’s retaliation
to it, whereas Ashworth argued that it should have been between the provocation
and the defendant’s loss of self-control (rather than the nature of the violence he
used against the victim). Ashworth’s worry that some cases resulted in dispropor-
tionately short prison sentences being imposed, when compared to the minimum
terms imposed in murder cases, is a further obvious example of his concern to
maintain a principled approach. It remains to be seen how the principle of
proportionality will be addressed under the new law. The government clearly
hopes that fewer pleas under the 2009 Act will succeed, and judges can now
exclude consideration of loss of control in what are viewed as weak cases. Never-
theless, there must be a real fear that the retention of the loss of self-control
requirement will continue to thwart many deserving cases.
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